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*124 Abstract 
The advent of the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) and the enactment of the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements 2005 (the Hague Convention) in Singapore presents an intriguing case study of the issues raised by the 
co-mingling of the rules of an international convention, jurisdictional rules for an international commercial court, and 
traditional common law jurisdictional principles within the private international law and procedural rules of a single 
national jurisdiction. This article highlights several key issues raised by the interaction between the SICC, Hague 
Convention, and common law jurisdictional rules, and proposes solutions to streamline these three sets of rules into a 
coherent and principled body of law. In addition, this article examines the experience of the Dubai International Financial 
Centre Court to elucidate lessons for the development of the SICC’s jurisdictional rules. 
  
I. Introduction 
The Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), in conjunction with the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements 2005 1 (the Hague Convention), represents a quantum leap forward for Singapore’s development into an 
internationally-recognised commercial litigation hub. Together, they present a transformative vision for the development of 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3038583 
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Singapore’s legal industry, in recognition of the increasingly transnational nature of commercial disputes in this globalised 
age. With its international bench and flexible rules on foreign law, foreign representation and evidence, the SICC aims to be a 
forum of choice for transnational litigation in the region and beyond. The Hague Convention, enacted *125 as Singapore law 
through the Choice of Court Agreements Act2 (CCAA), gives teeth to the SICC’s judgments by maximizing their 
enforceability across jurisdictions around the world. Together, the SICC and the Hague Convention have the potential to be a 
game-changer in transnational commercial litigation. 
  
The advent of these initiatives marks a major milestone in the development of Singapore’s private international law as well. 
As a result of these recent changes, Singapore has become an intriguing case study of how three disparate sets of 
jurisdictional rules, each with a very different genesis and purpose, can co-exist within a single national jurisdiction. At 
present, due to the relative youth of these institutions, the relationship between the SICC’s, Hague Convention’s, and 
common law’s jurisdictional rules remains to be clarified by a body of case law. This article aims to identify possible points 
of tension in the interaction between these three sets of jurisdictional rules, and suggest solutions to harmonise these rules 
into a coherent and principled body of law. The lessons learnt from Singapore’s experience may be of value to other 
jurisdictions considering similar legal developments in the future. For clarity of analysis, this article classifies the impact of 
the SICC and the Hague Convention on Singapore law into three distinct categories, which will be discussed in turn: 
jurisdiction agreements, exercise of jurisdiction in the Singapore High Court, and exercise of jurisdiction in the SICC. 
Finally, this article will conduct a comparative study of the Dubai International Financial Centre Court’s (DIFCC) 
jurisdictional rules to determine if the DIFCC’s experience as an international commercial court holds any lessons for the 
SICC’s private international law rules. For the avoidance of doubt, all references to the High Court in this article refer to the 
Singapore High Court excluding the SICC. 
  
II. The SICC and the Hague Convention 
The SICC was officially established as a division of the Singapore High Court3 on 5 January 2015.4 The key objectives 
undergirding the establishment of the SICC were to expand Singapore’s legal industry, encourage the usage of Singapore law 
in transnational commercial disputes, profile Singapore as a premier forum for commercial litigation,5 and spearhead the 
development of international commercial law by harmonising commercial law and practices across traditional common law 
and civil law boundaries.6 The SICC has jurisdiction over two main categories of cases: first, cases which are “international 
and commercial in nature” and where *126 parties have a written jurisdiction agreement in favour of the SICC7; second, cases 
which are deemed “appropriate” for a transfer from the High Court to the SICC.8 The following are some of the SICC’s 
unique features: the SICC may choose not to apply Singapore evidential rules,9 may allow counsel to argue points of foreign 
law based on submissions,10 allows registered foreign lawyers to appear before it,11 and has a distinctly international bench.12 
  
The Hague Convention seeks to do for litigation what the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards 1958 13 did for international arbitration. It promotes a scheme for the mutual enforcement of choice of court 
agreements across the Convention’s signatories, ensuring the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments handed 
down by the chosen courts. At the time of writing, the signatories to the Hague Convention include the Member States of the 
EU, Mexico, Singapore, Ukraine, and the US. Singapore signed the Convention on 25 March 2015, and to give effect to the 
Convention, the Singapore Parliament enacted the CCAA on 14 April 2016.14 In tandem with the SICC, the CCAA will be an 
important boost to Singapore’s efforts to become a desirable litigation destination, as commercial parties will be much more 
inclined to select the SICC as a dispute resolution venue if the SICC’s judgments are widely enforceable across jurisdictions 
around the world. 
  
III. Jurisdiction agreements 
Moving on to the substantive legal issues, the first area to be discussed is the law relating to the characterisation and effect of 
jurisdiction agreements. Where the parties in a dispute have a jurisdiction agreement in the contract governing their 
relationship, this agreement can be characterised as either exclusive or non-exclusive. An exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
has both prorogation and derogation functions, i.e. it contains an agreement between the parties to submit to the chosen court, 
as well as a promise not to commence proceedings in any other non-chosen courts.15 A non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
generally only has a prorogation function, i.e. it contains an agreement to submit to the chosen court without expressly 
disallowing the parties from commencing proceedings in non-chosen courts.16 The characterisation of a jurisdiction 
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agreement as exclusive or non-exclusive is of considerable practical importance—it influences the *127 subsequent 
applicable legal approach for the exercise of jurisdiction across the common law, SICC rules, and CCAA rules. 
  
As a preliminary step before a jurisdiction agreement can be characterised, the law governing its interpretation needs to be 
determined. Under the common law, the characterisation of a jurisdiction agreement is an issue of interpretation, which as a 
matter of contractual construction, is generally governed by the proper law of the contract.17 Notably, it has been highlighted 
that the trend towards the separability of the jurisdiction agreement may lead to a conclusion in an appropriate case that the 
parties intended the law of the chosen court to govern the agreement, rather than the proper law of the contract.18 This is 
arguably the position under the CCAA, which provides that the issue of the validity of a jurisdiction agreement is determined 
by the law of the chosen court.19 Although not expressly addressed by the wording of the CCAA, it is arguable that the same 
connecting factor would apply to issues of interpretation as well.20 On another view, the interpretation of a jurisdiction 
agreement where the CCAA is concerned rests in the provisions of the Hague Convention and thus the CCAA as a self-
contained interpretive regime.21 This view is supported by the intent of the Hague Convention’s framers in characterising 
art.3 as a “deeming” provision, rather than a presumption, in order to avoid potential entanglements with differing evidentiary 
rules relating to presumptions.22 A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the present article, and will be 
properly left for another occasion. 
  
Assuming that Singapore law applies to interpret the jurisdiction agreement,23 there are three possible approaches that can be 
taken to its characterisation. First, s.18F of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act24 (SCJA) provides that choice of SICC 
agreements are presumed to be exclusive unless there is express provision to the contrary. Second, under s.3(2) of the CCAA, 
a choice of court agreement is deemed to be exclusive as long as the requirements of the CCAA are met, unless there is 
express provision otherwise.25 Notably, unilaterally exclusive choice of court agreements under the common law will be 
characterised as non-exclusive under the Hague Convention and the CCAA, because the Hague Convention requires mutual 
exclusivity for an agreement to be considered as exclusive.26 Third, *128 under the common law, the classification of each 
clause as exclusive or non-exclusive is an exercise in contractual construction, whether it is exclusive or non-exclusive on its 
face.27 
  
For clarity of analysis, it will be useful to draw a distinction between choice of SICC agreements and choice of High Court or 
foreign court agreements. Where there is a choice of SICC agreement, the two approaches which could be used to interpret 
the jurisdiction agreement are s.18F of the SCJA and s.3(2) of the CCAA. The effect of these provisions is that there is 
considerable uniformity in the approach to the characterisation of choice of SICC agreements. Where there is a choice of the 
SICC, there is no practical difference whether the CCAA or the SCJA is applied to characterise the jurisdiction agreement, 
since both approaches are effectively the same. 
  
Matters are more complex where a choice of High Court or foreign court agreement is involved. In such situations, the two 
possible approaches that can be taken are the common law’s and the CCAA’s. On one level, the approaches are easy to 
distinguish—the CCAA’s approach applies when it is applicable to the dispute,28 and the common law’s approach applies in 
all other situations. On closer examination, the boundaries between the two approaches are not so clear. The CCAA is 
primarily concerned with jurisdiction agreements in the contexts of the exercise of jurisdiction, stay of proceedings in favour 
of another contracting state, and the recognition of foreign judgments. However, jurisdiction agreements which fall under the 
CCAA can be relevant in contexts which are not directly CCAA-related; for instance, the grant of anti-suit injunctions.29 In 
such situations, should the agreement be interpreted under the CCAA where the purposes of the CCAA are engaged, and 
under the common law for such non-CCAA purposes? Alternatively, the agreement could always be interpreted under the 
CCAA’s approach as long as the agreement falls under the scope of the CCAA. It has been argued that the latter approach 
would mean that the CCAA would have additional “side-effects on the common law in areas outside of its scope”.30 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that in such situations, having the same court apply two different characterisations of the same 
clause depending on the context of the application creates uncertainty and may be contrary to the expectations of commercial 
parties. As long as the CCAA applies to the jurisdiction agreement in any sense, the CCAA’s approach should be adopted 
even in contexts not expressly covered in the CCAA. Correlatively, on this view, the common law’s approach should only 
apply where the CCAA has no application to the jurisdiction agreement at all. 
  
Different legal effects follow upon the characterisation of a jurisdiction agreement as exclusive or non-exclusive under the 
respective approaches. When the jurisdiction agreement is characterised as exclusive, there are substantial *129 
commonalities in its effect on the court’s exercise of jurisdiction among the three sets of rules. In general, where a party 
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commences proceedings in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, under all three approaches, the Singapore courts 
will be very inclined to uphold the agreement in order to protect the parties’ bargain, although there remain minor differences 
between the three approaches with respect to the exact circumstances under which the Singapore courts will allow a breach of 
the agreement.31 
  
In contrast, there is a major divergence between the common law, SICC, and Hague Convention approaches with respect to 
the legal effect of a jurisdiction agreement characterised as non-exclusive under their respective approaches. Under the 
common law, the court would conduct a contractual analysis of the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement to determine the 
promissory content of the agreement, which will in turn influence whether a party’s conduct amounts to a breach of the 
agreement.32 If there is a breach of the agreement, the applicable approach is akin to that taken for exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements. If not, the court applies the Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd33 approach to decide whether it should 
exercise jurisdiction over the case, or grant an anti-suit injunction to restrain foreign proceedings.34 Some cases have 
suggested that a “modified Spiliada approach” would apply in such situations, where factors which should have been 
foreseeable at the time of contracting should not be taken into account in the forum non conveniens analysis.35 The exact 
influence of the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement depends on the circumstances.36 The Singapore Court of Appeal has 
held that in certain situations, the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause may have such a strong impact on the natural forum and 
vexatious conduct analysis that its practical effect can be similar to that of an exclusive jurisdiction clause.37 In contrast, the 
SICC does not distinguish between exclusive and non-exclusive SICC jurisdiction agreements for the purpose of an 
application for a stay of proceedings.38 However, this distinction may still be relevant for the purposes of *130 the grant of an 
anti-suit injunction.39 Under the Hague Convention, if a clause is characterised as a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement, the 
Hague Convention will not be applicable to the dispute.40 
  
As a final note on the issue of jurisdiction agreements, in addition to the characterisation of jurisdiction agreements as 
exclusive or non-exclusive, the CCAA also contains statutory presumptions which apply to the interpretation of jurisdiction 
agreements. Section 2(2) of the CCAA provides that an exclusive choice of High Court agreement is deemed to encompass 
the SICC as well, unless a contrary intention is proven.41 The practical impact of deeming the agreement a choice of the SICC 
would be to create grounds for the SICC to assume original jurisdiction over the case, or alternatively, if proceedings have 
already been commenced in the High Court, to potentially form a stronger argument that the proceedings are “more 
appropriate” to be heard in the SICC pursuant to Ord.110 rr.12(3B)(a)(ii) and 12(4)(a)(iii).42 However, it remains possible for 
the same effect to be achieved even if this provision is not engaged. For instance, consider the scenario of an international 
and commercial dispute, fitting neatly within the subject matter jurisdiction of the SICC, and with the contract between the 
litigating parties containing a choice of the High Court without expressly excluding the SICC. If the CCAA applies to this 
case, the combined effect of s.2(2) and s.3(2) will be to deem the agreement an exclusive choice of SICC agreement. If the 
CCAA does not apply, for instance, where the choice of High Court agreement is unilaterally exclusive, the common law 
approach will be applied to conduct an analysis of parties’ intentions to determine the contractual content of the clause. If this 
contractual analysis yields the conclusion that the choice of the High Court encompasses the SICC as well, then arguably, 
s.18F of the SCJA will be engaged to characterise the agreement as an exclusive one, leading to the same conclusion as if the 
CCAA was applicable. 
  
IV. Exercise of jurisdiction in the High Court 
The second area of law impacted by the advent of the SICC and the CCAA is the law regarding the High Court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction. One of the key legal issues to be resolved in this regard is whether and how the High Court’s test for the exercise 
of its jurisdiction should be influenced by the existence of the SICC. 
  
A. Influence of the SICC on the High Court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
The common law approach to the exercise of jurisdiction in Singapore is well established.43 Briefly, Singapore law is aligned 
with the House of Lords decision in Spiliada: the overarching inquiry in determining whether the court should exercise its 
jurisdiction or grant a stay of proceedings involves a search for the *131 most appropriate forum where “the case may be 
tried more suitably for the interests of all parties and the ends of justice”44; that is, the natural forum for the dispute at hand. 
  
At the first stage of the Spiliada analysis, the court will consider factors such as the parties’ personal connections, the 
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dispute’s connections to events and transactions, governing law, other proceedings, and shape of the litigation to determine 
which is the most appropriate forum to hear the dispute.45 If a defendant successfully proves at this stage that a foreign court 
is the more appropriate forum to hear the dispute, the court will ordinarily grant a stay of proceedings, unless the plaintiff can 
successfully prove that the case should still be heard in the forum because of the interests of justice. This is the second stage 
of the Spiliada analysis, and factors which the court will consider at this stage include the presence of a time bar, whether 
parties’ choice of law will be given effect by the foreign court, and any other factors that go towards showing that a stay of 
proceedings will result in a denial of substantial justice to the plaintiff.46 Where a case involves service out of jurisdiction, the 
burden of proof is reversed; the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the forum is the most appropriate forum to justify 
service out of jurisdiction in the first place. At the inter partes stage, the defendant may either seek to set aside service of the 
writ or apply for a stay of proceedings, although the most strategic option would be the former, in order to take advantage of 
the allocation of burden of proof.47 
  
The issue of whether the existence of the SICC should influence the natural forum test as applied in the High Court was 
considered by the Singapore High Court in the case of IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE.48 In summary, the 
Assistant Registrar in IM Skaugen held that the existence of the SICC has a direct influence on the analysis of the natural 
forum factors, and should thus be taken into account in the natural forum calculus. For instance, the ability of foreign counsel 
to directly submit on foreign law in the SICC may reduce the inconvenience of arguing points of foreign law.49 
  
It is suggested that the possibility of a transfer to the SICC should indeed influence the High Court’s application of the 
Spiliada test. There are several justifications one can offer for this view. First, excluding the SICC from the Spiliada calculus 
would mean that the assessment of Singapore’s appropriateness as a forum would not reflect key characteristics of the legal 
system in Singapore. For instance, the SICC can serve as a one-stop forum where several different issues with different 
applicable foreign laws can be argued more conveniently than in a regular domestic court; a fact which may lean towards 
allowing the suit to proceed in Singapore in order to prevent fragmentation of litigation. Second, the Singapore High Court in 
Accent Delight International Ltd v Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar *132 50 signalled a willingness to take the SICC into account 
in the Spiliada test by considering the unique characteristics of the SICC at the stage when the High Court was determining 
whether to exercise jurisdiction over the case. Finally, at the level of legal policy, taking the SICC into account in the 
Spiliada test would facilitate the SICC’s policy objective of being a leading forum for transnational dispute resolution in Asia 
and beyond51 by maximising the number of cases over which the SICC can assume jurisdiction. If the SICC is taken into 
account in the Spiliada test, cases that may otherwise be heard in foreign forums may be found appropriate for the SICC to 
hear, thus maximising the reach of the SICC. 
  
If the possibility of a transfer to the SICC can influence the Spiliada test, can it also influence the “strong cause” test where 
there is a jurisdiction agreement between the parties? At the common law, where the parties have contractually chosen a court 
in which to bring their dispute, the party seeking to commence proceedings in a non-chosen court will only be able to do so if 
he can demonstrate “strong cause” amounting to exceptional circumstance for the court to hear the case.52 In principle, there 
are no reasons to suggest why the possibility of a transfer should not influence the “strong cause” test. The SICC’s distinctive 
procedural features could neutralise any advantages of pursuing foreign proceedings, which may potentially make it more 
difficult to make a case for “strong cause” in the face of a Singapore jurisdiction agreement53 and easier to do so in the face of 
a foreign jurisdiction agreement. Nevertheless, it may be argued that it would be an affront to party autonomy to allow 
“strong cause” to be made out in the face of a foreign jurisdiction agreement in favour of a potential transfer to the SICC.54 
However, the Rules of Court do not preclude this possibility: there is no provision which expressly prevents the High Court 
from transferring cases to the SICC where there is an express choice of a foreign court. In fact, the High Court has the power 
to order a transfer on its own motion even if one party contests the transfer.55 It is useful to note that this issue remains a live 
one even where the CCAA’s jurisdictional approach applies instead of the “strong cause” test, to the extent that the 
considerations under the CCAA’s approach overlap with the “strong cause” ones. 
  
Notably, the Assistant Registrar in IM Skaugen further opined that since the High Court should take the SICC into account in 
the natural forum calculus only if the case would be subsequently transferred to the SICC, the better approach might be for 
the High Court to apply the SICC’s private international law rules at this stage to determine whether the High Court itself 
should exercise international jurisdiction. This would ensure that the High Court does not unduly take the SICC into account 
when the case is not suitable for transfer in any case. However, the *133 suggestion that the SICC’s private international law 
rules should apply in a case where the High Court is hearing a case prima facie amenable to a transfer to the SICC effectively 
places the question of internal allocation of jurisdiction prior to the question of whether the High Court should exercise 
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international jurisdiction to hear the case in the first place. This is conceptually problematic. The High Court’s rules of 
international jurisdiction are premised on a delicate balance of principle, policy and international comity,56 a balance which is 
especially important in view of its status as a court of general civil jurisdiction. Rules of international jurisdiction intended 
for a specialist court with jurisdiction only in certain restricted situations would be unlikely to be able to strike the same 
delicate balance as effectively. 
  
It is suggested that a better solution would be for the High Court to apply its own test for international jurisdiction regardless 
whether a case is prima facie amenable to a transfer to the SICC. If faced with such a case, the High Court should consider 
the possibility of a transfer to the SICC as part of its Spiliada analysis, and accordingly, should make an assessment as to 
whether the case is indeed appropriate for a transfer to the SICC. If it is, and if the Spiliada analysis leads to a conclusion that 
Singapore is the natural forum, the High Court will exercise international jurisdiction over the case, and then order it to be 
transferred to the SICC, if appropriate. On this analysis, the question of international jurisdiction remains conceptually 
distinct from the question of internal allocation of jurisdiction, while at the same time ensuring that the SICC is not unduly 
taken into account to modify jurisdictional rules in a case that eventually turns out to be inappropriate for a transfer. 
  
B. Influence of the Hague Convention on the High Court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
The enactment of the Hague Convention through the CCAA has a direct impact on the Singapore High Court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction as well. Where the CCAA applies to a case with an exclusive choice of Singapore court clause,57 the Singapore 
High Court must exercise jurisdiction over the case unless the jurisdiction agreement is null and void under Singapore law.58 
Conversely, if the choice of court clause designates a foreign contracting state, the Singapore High Court must decline to 
exercise jurisdiction unless a limited variety of exceptional circumstances are proven.59 
  
Where one party breaches a choice of court clause designating a foreign contracting state by suing in Singapore, it may be 
argued that the common law “strong cause” test is sufficient to give effect to the purposes of the CCAA, and that there is no 
need for a distinct Hague Convention approach to determine if the High Court should grant a stay of proceedings. In support 
of this proposition, it may be said that the “strong cause” test lends sufficient weight to the choice of court clause by giving 
effect to it unless exceptional circumstances can be proven, *134 and that the “strong cause” test can be modified to take into 
account the CCAA’s prescriptions of the exceptional circumstances that would warrant the High Court exercising jurisdiction 
despite the choice of a foreign court. This would appear to have the advantage of legal simplicity, as the High Court would 
then be able to apply the “strong cause” test across CCAA and non-CCAA cases. However, it is suggested that this would be 
a mere veneer of simplicity, as this modified “strong cause” test would be substantially different from the common law 
version.60 The considerations involved in demonstrating exceptional circumstances under the common law “strong cause” 
approach are similar to the factors examined under the Spiliada test.61 In contrast, the circumstances under which the High 
Court should still hear the case notwithstanding the choice of a foreign contracting state are narrowly and exhaustively 
defined in ss.12(1)(a)-(e) of the CCAA. Although there may be a degree of overlap in the considerations under the “strong 
cause” test and the circumstances prescribed under the CCAA,62 it is nonetheless suggested that legal clarity would favour 
acknowledging that a distinct and unique test should be applicable where a dispute falls under the CCAA’s scope. 
  
Different considerations should apply in the symmetrical situation where one party breaches a choice of Singapore court 
clause by suing in a foreign contracting state, and the innocent party applies for an anti-suit injunction from the Singapore 
High Court against the party in breach. There are three possible views one can take to this issue. The first is to ignore the 
Hague Convention context in which the application has arisen, since the Hague Convention does not govern interim measures 
of protection, which should be taken to include anti-suit injunctions.63 On this view, the High Court should apply Singapore’s 
law on anti-suit injunctions simpliciter. However, it is suggested that since the grant of an anti-suit injunction will overlap 
closely with the functions of the Hague Convention and will indeed have a direct impact on the effectiveness of the 
jurisdiction agreement, the better view is that the High Court should take the Convention into account in its analysis. Thus, 
the second view is that the Hague Convention’s strong presumption in favour of a chosen contracting state exercising 
jurisdiction should be buttressed by an equally robust legal framework in the contexts of stay of proceedings and anti-suit 
injunction applications. On this view, the High Court should grant anti-suit injunctions almost as a matter of course in such 
situations. This view would be in line with the fundamental purpose of the Convention as stated in its preamble; that is, to 
ensure the effectiveness of choice of court agreements.64 The third view is that it should be borne in mind that the Hague 
Convention allows a non-chosen *135 court to assume jurisdiction in specific situations.65 Thus, granting an anti-suit 
injunction against proceedings in a non-chosen court that the Hague Convention has allowed to assume jurisdiction over 
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proceedings would actually be inconsistent with the framework of the Hague Convention. It is suggested that the third view 
best gives effect to the purposes of the Hague Convention. As such, in determining whether to grant an anti-suit injunction in 
such situations, the High Court should have regard to the specific circumstances surrounding the proceedings in the non-
chosen court in order to remain faithful to the framework of the Convention. 
  
The introduction of the SICC into the picture presents additional legal issues. Where a choice of Singapore court clause 
specifically designates the High Court to the exclusion of the SICC, but the essence of the dispute is international and 
commercial and eminently suitable for a transfer to the SICC, can the High Court transfer the case to the SICC, even if a 
party objects to the transfer? This is a matter of internal allocation of jurisdiction, engaging Ord.110 r.12 of the Rules of 
Court. If the parties have clearly chosen the High Court to the exclusion of the SICC in their jurisdiction agreement, s.2(2) of 
the CCAA is not engaged. Following recent amendments to the Rules of Court, the relevance of parties’ consent now 
depends on whether the CCAA governs the agreement. If so, the new Ord.110 r.12(3B) is applicable, which provides that 
consent from the parties must be obtained before a transfer to the SICC.66 If not, then Ord.110 r.12(4) is applicable, which 
allows transfers to the SICC on the High Court’s motion in the absence of parties’ consent. In this situation, it may be argued 
that the parties’ choice of the High Court to the exclusion of the SICC would make the case not “more appropriate” for a 
transfer to the SICC in accordance with Ord.110 r.12(4)(a)(iii),67 as this would run counter to the principle of party autonomy. 
However, the persuasiveness of the principle of party autonomy in such situations is considerably muted in view of the fact 
that the rule itself expressly provides for a transfer of proceedings by the High Court even in the absence of consent. Thus, 
lack of consent in itself is unlikely to be able to make a case not “more appropriate” for transfer. 
  
V. Exercise of jurisdiction in the SICC 
The third area of law to be discussed is the law regarding the exercise of jurisdiction in the SICC. 
  
The rules governing the SICC’s jurisdiction are set out in Ord.110 of the Rules of Court.68 Order 110 r.7 addresses the 
existence of jurisdiction: it states that the SICC has jurisdiction to hear a case if the case is of an international and commercial 
nature, the parties have submitted to the SICC under a written jurisdiction agreement, and the parties do not seek relief 
connected to a prerogative order.69 Order 110 r.8 goes toward the exercise of jurisdiction: the SICC may decline to assume 
jurisdiction if it is “not appropriate” for the SICC to hear the case.70 The reference to “appropriateness” is repeated in Ord.110 
r.12(3B) and 12(4) in the context of *136 the requirements for a transfer of proceedings from the High Court to the SICC. 
One of the requirements for a case to be transferred to the SICC, common to both Ord.110 r.12(3B) and 12(4), is that the 
High Court must consider that the case is “more appropriate” to be heard in the SICC. 
  
A. The applicable approach for the exercise of the SICC’s international jurisdiction 
The High Court in IM Skaugen suggested that the applicable approach for the exercise of the SICC’s international 
jurisdiction under Ord.110 r.8 should be the Australian “clearly inappropriate forum” test set out in Voth.71 This was because 
the Assistant Registrar was of the opinion that the wording of the rule closely matched the focus of the Voth inquiry. 
Although these comments were merely obiter dicta, since the issue before the High Court in IM Skaugen was a transfer of 
proceedings from the High Court to the SICC, the High Court’s decision in this case remains useful as the only case thus far 
discussing the principles governing the SICC’s exercise of jurisdiction. 
  
It is suggested that there are strong arguments weighing against the application of the common law jurisdictional approaches, 
that is, the Voth test, the Spiliada test, and the “strong cause” test, for the purposes of Ord.110 r.8. Focusing on the Voth and 
Spiliada tests first, one would observe that these tests are principally focused on foreign connections.72 This inclination of the 
two tests does not sit well with Ord.110 r.8(2), which provides that foreign connections alone cannot be determinative in the 
SICC’s decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Although foreign connections can be part of the decisional matrix, 
provided that they are not the sole consideration, the wording of the rule suggests that tests which inherently involve a heavy 
focus on foreign connections may not be aligned with the rule’s legislative intent. Also, the common law approaches are 
unlikely to comport well with the policy objectives of the SICC. Since the raison d’être of the SICC is to draw as many 
complex international commercial cases to Singapore as possible,73 it stands to reason that the SICC should decline 
jurisdiction only on very narrow grounds.74 However, neither the Spiliada nor Voth approach would be able to serve this 
purpose well, since they are tests formulated for the purposes of courts exercising general civil jurisdiction, and accordingly 
The impact of the Singapore International Commercial..., C.J.Q. 2018, 37(1),...  
 
 
 © 2018 Thomson Reuters. 8 
 
allow the courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a wide variety of situations where the interests of justice or international 
comity require.75 On the other hand, since the SICC is a specialist court with jurisdiction only in certain restricted situations, a 
different approach to the exercise of jurisdiction is justifiable to give stronger effect to the SICC’s policy objectives. *137 
  
A stronger argument may be made for the application of the common law “strong cause” test for the purposes of Ord.110 r.8, 
since it would lead to a strong inclination for the SICC to exercise jurisdiction, thus sitting better with the policy objectives of 
the SICC. However, the factors considered in the “strong cause” test are also principally focused on foreign connections.76 
Therefore, the same arguments which apply to the Spiliada and Voth tests to limit their applicability to the SICC for this 
reason also apply to the “strong cause” test. It may be argued that the “strong cause” test can be modified in application to 
suit the SICC’s purposes more effectively, for instance, by placing a heavy emphasis on the existence of the jurisdiction 
agreement and reducing its focus on foreign connections.77 However, it is suggested that legal clarity would favour the 
recognition that a unique jurisdictional approach is required for the purposes of the SICC. 
  
In light of the preceding arguments, what then should be the applicable approach to the exercise of the SICC’s international 
jurisdiction? The starting point to determine the applicable approach for the exercise of the SICC’s jurisdiction is Ord.110 
r.8(1). To recapitulate, this rule provides that the SICC may decline to assume jurisdiction if it is “not appropriate” for the 
action to be heard in the SICC. It is suggested that Ord.110 r.8(3), which provides that the court must have regard to its 
international and commercial character in exercising its discretion under r.8(1), provides a guide to the inclination one should 
take in interpreting the “not appropriate” test. Since all cases which come before the SICC necessarily have to be 
international and commercial for the SICC to have jurisdiction in the first place, Ord.110 r.8(3) could be construed as a 
suggestion that the starting point for the “not appropriate” test is that every case is an appropriate one.78 
  
However, in determining “appropriateness” pursuant to Ord.110 r.8, the requirement that a case is international and 
commercial in nature should not be the sole one. Indeed, it has been argued that if this requirement was intended to be the 
sole consideration, the rule could simply have provided as much by including the requirement of “international and 
commercial nature” in the same subsection as the test of “appropriateness”, rather than making the rules unnecessarily 
convoluted by separating the two concepts into different subsections.79 In addition, if the operative test under Ord.110 r.8 
consisted solely of this requirement, it would effectively mean that the SICC has no test for international jurisdiction; the 
only issue that matters for the purposes of the SICC’s jurisdiction would be subject matter jurisdiction. 
  
What should these other grounds of declining jurisdiction comprise, then? It is expected that their content will become clearer 
as cases come to the SICC for decision. Preliminarily, one may offer the suggestion that the exceptional circumstances under 
which the SICC should decline to exercise jurisdiction can be broadly categorised into three groups: public policy, non-
justiciability, and *138 natural justice. The ground of public policy would capture cases which are international and 
commercial on the surface but not so in substance, a possibility envisaged by the High Court in IM Skaugen.80 This category 
of cases would include cases which are ostensibly international and commercial but are fundamentally disputes relating to 
family law or employment law, or which turn on questions of constitutional validity. The ground of non-justiciability would 
cover cases which involve questions about the validity of foreign administrative action or any other matters which could 
potentially have an impact on foreign governments or legal systems. Although Ord.110 r.8(2) provides that the SICC must 
not decline jurisdiction solely on the basis of the existence of foreign connections in themselves, it may be argued that in 
certain situations, such connections give rise to a compelling policy concern not to interfere with an issue that clearly should 
be heard in another jurisdiction. As for the ground of natural justice, this could cover cases where there is a demonstrated 
high risk of conflicting judgments from different jurisdictions,81 and where the exercise of jurisdiction over the proceedings 
would lead to significant inconvenience and expense to the litigants involved. 
  
Although the common law jurisdictional approaches also incorporate concerns in these three categories, there are major 
differences in both degree and kind between the SICC’s jurisdictional approach and the common law’s approach. As a matter 
of degree, the SICC should decline jurisdiction only in the face of clear and convincing evidence that one of these principles 
would be incontrovertibly contravened if the SICC exercises jurisdiction over the case. As for the difference in kind, the 
focus of the SICC’s inquiry should not be a comparison between the appropriateness of different jurisdictions, but rather, a 
consideration of whether the strong presumption for the SICC to exercise jurisdiction as long as there is a nexus of 
jurisdiction can be rebutted by any compelling factors. In this regard, as mandated by Ord.110 r.8(2), a preponderance of 
connections to foreign jurisdictions in themselves would be insufficient to displace this presumption if they do not go towards 
proving the manifest inappropriateness of the SICC hearing the proceedings. 
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It is suggested that it would not be inconsistent with the broader policy objective of having narrow grounds to decline 
jurisdiction for the SICC to retain the discretion to stay proceedings in such exceptional circumstances. The availability of 
such discretion is a recognition of the sometimes-conflicting policy considerations that the SICC will have to balance82; for 
example, the overarching policy imperative to promote Singapore as a forum of choice in international commercial litigation, 
alongside the duty to ensure the “coordinated, coherent and orderly resolution of transnational commercial litigation across 
national borders”83 as an international commercial court. *139 
  
B. The applicable approach for a transfer of proceedings to the SICC 
The Assistant Registrar in IM Skaugen also discussed the applicable approach governing a transfer of proceedings to the 
SICC under Ord.110 r.12(4). Under Ord.110 r.12(4), the High Court may transfer cases to the SICC either on its own motion 
or with the consent of all parties, provided that the case is “more appropriate” to be heard in the SICC.84 With respect to the 
“more appropriate” requirement, the Assistant Registrar held that the operative requirement for a case to be transferred to the 
SICC pursuant to Ord.110 r.12(4) is whether the case is “in substance both international and commercial in nature”,85 filtering 
out cases which are superficially international and commercial but are actually not so in substance. The same “more 
appropriate” test also features in the new Ord.110 r.12(3B). Thus, the Assistant Registrar’s discussion of the “more 
appropriate” test in Ord.110 r.12(4) should be applicable in the Ord.110 r.12(3B) context as well. 
  
As a preliminary observation, in contrast to the applicable approach for the High Court’s exercise of international 
jurisdiction, a determination as to whether the High Court should transfer proceedings to the SICC should engage different 
considerations. This would be a matter of internal allocation of jurisdiction, governed by Ord.110 r.12, instead of 
international jurisdiction, governed by Ord.110 r.8. The issue of subject matter appropriateness is a key consideration in this 
context. Also, the issue of judicial efficiency would become an additional consideration: in view of the potential hassle and 
delay involved in transferring a case from the High Court to the SICC, such a transfer should have to be justified by proving 
that hearing the case in the SICC instead would deliver a significant advantage to the judicial process or the litigants. 
  
The approach applied by the High Court in IM Skaugen, i.e. a case would be “more appropriate” for transfer from the High 
Court to the SICC if it is “in substance both international and commercial in nature”,86 accords well with the framework of the 
Rules of Court and gives effect to the importance of subject matter appropriateness in the internal allocation of jurisdiction. 
However, this criterion should not be the sole factor determining whether a case is “more appropriate” for a transfer pursuant 
to Ord.110 r.12(3B)(a)(ii) or 12(4)(a)(iii). Instead, the question of the appropriateness of a transfer should engage a balancing 
exercise weighing the tangible benefits a transfer to the SICC would bring to the dispute resolution process and to the 
litigants involved against the inconvenience and delay of effecting such a transfer. For example, where the proceedings have 
already reached a relatively advanced stage, a transfer would cause “substantial delay to the resolution of the dispute”,87 and 
this should be a weighty consideration for the High Court in determining the appropriateness of a transfer. In contrast, where 
a transfer to the SICC can level out the advantages a foreign forum has over the High Court, as was the case in Accent 
Delight, this would arguably make a *140 persuasive case for a transfer to the SICC, in order to keep the proceedings within 
Singapore’s jurisdiction and promote the policy objectives of the SICC. 
  
C. Influence of the Hague Convention on SICC’s exercise of jurisdiction 
The provisions of the CCAA introduce another level of complexity to the rules governing the SICC’s exercise of jurisdiction. 
As mentioned earlier in this article, under s.11(1) of the CCAA, where the SICC is chosen in a jurisdiction agreement, the 
SICC must exercise jurisdiction unless the jurisdiction agreement is null and void under Singapore law.88 However, under 
Ord.110 r.8, the SICC may decline to exercise jurisdiction if it is not appropriate for the SICC to hear the case, for instance, if 
the case is not international and commercial in nature. 
  
In light of these provisions, what should the SICC do in a case where there is an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of 
the SICC to the exclusion of the High Court, but where the substance of the case is not international and commercial in 
nature? In such a situation, the SICC does not have jurisdiction over the case, and is obliged to transfer the case to the High 
Court under Ord.110 r.10(3)(a), provided the High Court has jurisdiction over the case. However, Ord.110 r.10(3)(a)(ii) 
requires parties to consent to the transfer. If parties object to the transfer, the SICC must dismiss or stay the proceedings, or 
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make any other order it sees fit.89 Could “any other order it sees fit” encompass an order to transfer the case to the High Court 
under Ord.110 r.12(3) even in the absence of parties’ consent? One interpretation is that it should not, since such a reading of 
Ord.110 r.10(3)(b) would contradict the requirement of parties’ consent for a transfer in Ord.110 r.10(3)(a). Another 
interpretation is that the requirement of parties’ consent for a transfer is intended to safeguard the enforceability of the 
judgment, as art.8(5) of the Hague Convention provides that “recognition or enforcement of the judgment may be refused 
against a party who objected to the transfer in a timely manner in the State of origin”,90 rather than to restrict the court’s 
power to effect such transfers. On this view, the absence of consent does not tie the court’s hands but merely has a negative 
impact on the enforceability of the subsequent judgment following a non-consensual transfer. Notably, this issue has been 
settled by the latest amendment to the Rules of Court. Under the new Ord.110 r.10(3B), it is specifically stated that Ord.110 
r.10(3)(b) does not enable the High Court to make an order for a transfer. Thus, the Rules of Court have expressly opted in 
favour of the first interpretation suggested above. 
  
D. Joinder of third parties in the SICC 
The principles governing the SICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over third parties to proceedings also deserve consideration. 
Under the common law, the principles governing the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over third parties are identical to the 
regular principles for the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction. A third party can *141 challenge the court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction by applying for a stay of proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens.91 If there is a jurisdiction 
agreement governing the dispute in relation to the third party, the court will apply the “strong cause” test to determine if it 
should exercise jurisdiction over the dispute.92 The ensuing discussion will focus on the scenario where there is no 
jurisdiction agreement applicable to the third party. 
  
What is the applicable approach for the SICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over third parties in such situations? Order 110 r.9 
governs the SICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over third parties, and provides that the SICC can exercise jurisdiction over a 
third party if the case is “appropriate”93 to be heard by the SICC. If the third party is not within Singapore, a preliminary 
question arises as to the relationship between this “appropriate” test and the “proper” case requirement for service out of 
jurisdiction under Ord.11 r.2(2).94 Under the common law, the “proper” case requirement is met if the Spiliada calculus points 
to Singapore as the natural forum. Does the “appropriate” test supersede the “proper” case requirement, or do both 
requirements remain applicable? It is suggested that the better view is that the “proper” case requirement remains valid, as the 
structure of Ord.110 r.9 suggests that the question of “appropriateness”, provided for in Ord.110 r.9(1)(b)(ii), is distinct from 
the requirement that the procedures for joining the third party are complied with, which is mentioned in Ord.110 r.9(1)(a). On 
this view, the “proper” case requirement should be complied with as a prerequisite before the question of “appropriateness” is 
considered. As such, since the “proper” case requirement invokes the Spiliada calculus, the test of “appropriateness” under 
Ord.110 r.9(1)(b)(ii) should be distinct from the natural forum approach for it to have any meaningful content. 
  
In light of the preceding discussion, there are two possible interpretations of this rule. The first interpretation of Ord.110 r.9 is 
that it applies the same test for the exercise of the SICC’s jurisdiction for both regular and joinder cases, i.e. the SICC must 
have regard to the international and commercial nature of the dispute,95 and in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction, 
cannot rely solely on foreign connections. This interpretation is supported by Ord.110 r.9(3), which as mentioned above, 
echoes Ord.110 r.8(3). This interpretation is also supported by the common law model, which applies the same test for the 
exercise of jurisdiction in both joinder and regular cases. The advantage of this interpretation is consistency with the rules for 
the exercise of the SICC’s jurisdiction between both joinder and regular cases. 
  
The second interpretation of Ord.110 r.9 is that it is a unique test, largely similar to the test for regular cases in the SICC but 
differing in that it allows foreign *142 connections solely to determine whether the SICC should exercise jurisdiction.96 This 
interpretation is supported by the absence of a provision equivalent to Ord.110 r.8(2) in Ord.110 r.9.97 If the requirements in 
r.8 were intended to apply equally in r.9, it is difficult to see why they were not simply included in r.9 itself. There is also a 
principled basis for drawing such a distinction between the applicable approaches in joinder and regular cases; since the 
SICC can exercise original jurisdiction over third parties to join them to proceedings even in the absence of a choice of the 
SICC agreement governing their dispute, it stands to reason that a higher threshold ought to apply for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over third parties. It is suggested that this interpretation of Ord.110 r.9 should be preferred, as it best accords with 
the tenor of the rules and does justice to the interests of third parties. 
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E. Anti-suit injunctions in the SICC 
Given that the SICC is a division of the Singapore High Court, with all its attendant powers,98 the SICC presumably also has 
the power to grant injunctive relief in the form of anti-suit injunctions. Anti-suit injunctions are an important remedy in 
transnational litigation and the law relating to the grant of anti-suit injunctions is a significant category of private 
international law. As such, it is worthwhile to discuss how the advent of the SICC will impact the law on anti-suit 
injunctions. 
  
Under the common law, there are three main categories of cases justifying the grant of anti-suit injunctions. The first category 
is where the defendant has acted in a vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable manner in his commencement of proceedings 
in a foreign court.99 To determine whether an anti-suit injunction should be granted in this category of cases, the Singapore 
courts will consider the vexation and oppression of the foreign proceedings to the plaintiffs and injustice to the defendant if 
he is deprived of advantages in the foreign forum.100 What amounts to vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct 
cannot be and should not be defined exhaustively; rather, it depends on the facts of each case.101 As a recognition of the 
importance of international comity in the law of anti-suit injunctions, a prerequisite for the court to award an anti-suit 
injunction in such situations is that it must be the natural forum for the dispute.102 This requirement is intended to mitigate the 
implicit interference in the proceedings of a foreign *143 jurisdiction103 by allowing an anti-suit injunction only if the forum 
has “a sufficient interest in, or connection with, the matter in question”.104 
  
The second category is where the court acts to prevent the breach of an agreement by granting an anti-suit injunction. This 
generally refers to jurisdiction agreements, although settlement agreements, choice of law agreements, and arbitration 
agreements can arguably justify the grant of an anti-suit injunction as well.105 The applicable approach at common law 
diverges depending on whether the clause is classified as a non-exclusive or exclusive jurisdiction clause. Where the effect of 
the jurisdiction clause is exclusive, proceedings commenced in a non-chosen forum will amount to a breach of the agreement. 
In both Singapore and English law, where there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause, and there is a claim falling within its 
scope being pursued in a non-chosen forum, the court will ordinarily grant an anti-suit injunction unless the party in breach 
can show strong reasons for being allowed to continue the proceedings in the non-chosen forum.106 Where the effect of the 
jurisdiction clause is non-exclusive, the legal analysis will be substantially the same as in the first category of cases. 
However, the existence of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause can remain significant as a factor in a natural forum analysis, 
and also to determine if the foreign proceedings were brought in a vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable manner.107 
  
The third category of cases warranting the grant of an anti-suit injunction is founded upon the court’s inherent jurisdiction to 
prevent its own processes from being used unjustly and to protect the integrity of its own processes. For present purposes, the 
first two categories will be the focus of discussion. 
  
With the common law background thus set out, we move to a discussion of the applicable approach for the grant of anti-suit 
injunctions in the SICC. There are three distinct scenarios in which the SICC may grant anti-suit injunctions. The first 
scenario may arise if a case is transferred to the SICC from the High Court in the absence of a Singapore jurisdiction 
agreement, and one of the parties subsequently commences proceedings in a foreign court. In this situation, the SICC should 
presumably apply the common law vexatious and oppressive conduct test, since Ord.110 does not set out a specific test that 
should govern the grant of anti-suit injunctions from the SICC. In any case, the principles in Ord.110 governing the exercise 
of the SICC’s jurisdiction are manifestly unsuitable in the context of anti-suit injunctions; the jurisprudential basis for the 
grant of an anti-suit injunction in such situations is grounded in the personal equity generated by the conduct of *144 the 
defendant,108 and it is difficult to see how any test for the grant of an anti-suit injunction based on the SICC’s principles for 
the exercise of its jurisdiction will accord with this conceptual basis for anti-suit injunctions. 
  
Under the common law vexatious and oppressive conduct test, a prerequisite for the grant of the anti-suit injunction is that 
the forum must be the natural forum for the dispute. This requirement may present additional issues in the context of the 
SICC. What if the SICC is not the natural forum under the Spiliada test? It is suggested that the scale of this problem depends 
on the test of international jurisdiction applied by the High Court before the transfer of proceedings to the SICC. If the High 
Court takes the SICC into account in its application of the Spiliada test to determine whether to exercise its own international 
jurisdiction, as argued for in this article, then this problem dissipates, since the Spiliada test would have required Singapore to 
be the natural forum for the High Court to exercise jurisdiction in the first place. However, if the High Court applies the 
SICC’s own test of international jurisdiction to determine whether the High Court itself should hear the case, as suggested by 
the High Court in IM Skaugen, then this issue will become a real problem. The SICC may be faced with a peculiar situation 
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where it has validly exercised jurisdiction over a case subsequent to a transfer from the High Court, but is unable to grant 
anti-suit injunctions in support of its own proceedings because Singapore is not the natural forum under the Spiliada test. This 
issue underscores the importance of maintaining a conceptual separation between international jurisdiction and internal 
allocation of jurisdiction, and lends further support to this article’s argument in section IV.A that the High Court should apply 
its own rules of international jurisdiction even when faced with a case prima facie manifestly suitable for a transfer to the 
SICC. 
  
The second scenario arises when one party sues in a contracting state of the Hague Convention, in breach of a choice of SICC 
jurisdiction agreement. In an ideal situation, the foreign contracting state would suspend or dismiss proceedings unless one of 
the limited exceptions provided under art.6 of the Hague Convention is proven. This would render anti-suit injunctions 
unnecessary. However, if this mechanism is not adhered to, anti-suit injunctions remain a useful tool. Should the innocent 
party decide to apply for an anti-suit injunction in the SICC, what approach should the SICC take to determine whether to 
grant the anti-suit injunction? In such a situation, it is suggested that the test for the grant of an anti-suit injunction should be 
aligned with the jurisdictional regime of the Hague Convention. As argued in section IV.B of this article, this means that the 
SICC should have close regard to the circumstances surrounding the proceedings in the non-chosen foreign court: on one 
hand, anti-suit injunctions should be granted to reinforce the jurisdiction mandated by the Hague Convention, but on the other 
hand, in specific situations where the Hague Convention has allowed a non-chosen court to assume jurisdiction, anti-suit 
injunctions should not be granted to prejudice such foreign proceedings which are expressly permitted under the Hague 
Convention. 
  
The third scenario occurs when one party sues in a non-contracting state, in breach of a choice of SICC jurisdiction 
agreement. In this situation, to determine *145 whether to grant an anti-suit injunction, the SICC should apply the common 
law “strong cause” test, in the absence of specific rules governing the grant of anti-suit injunctions in the SICC. Notably, out 
of the three scenarios considered here, this scenario would warrant the most liberal rules for the grant of anti-suit injunctions: 
first, parties have explicitly chosen the SICC, and the law has demonstrated a strong inclination towards protecting the 
parties’ contractual bargain; second, the Hague Convention does not present any constraints here, since it will not be 
available for the defendant to argue that they are being permitted by the Hague Convention to sue in the non-chosen foreign 
court. 
  
As a final point on this subject, it is useful to bear in mind that there may be practical limitations for the usefulness of anti-
suit injunctions from international commercial courts. As the SICC may hear disputes between parties with limited or no 
physical connections to Singapore, a party in breach of an SICC jurisdiction agreement may potentially proceed in foreign 
jurisdictions with impunity even in the face of an SICC anti-suit injunction and being held in contempt of court in 
Singapore.109 It has been suggested that this issue is less relevant where the international commercial court is situated in an 
international financial centre or transportation hub, as the SICC is, since being held in contempt of court in such jurisdictions 
may be a major inconvenience to business operations.110 
  
IV. A comparative perspective—the Dubai International Financial Centre courts 
The SICC is sometimes compared with the Dubai International Financial Centre courts, in view of their numerous 
similarities: a focus on international commercial litigation,111 a bench comprising leading international jurists,112 and flexible 
rules of representation for foreign lawyers.113 The DIFCC was originally established to serve as the main dispute resolution 
forum for the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), a specially-designated financial centre within the Emirate of 
Dubai in the UAE. However, since 2011, the DIFCC’s reach has broadened to include disputes where parties have agreed to 
litigate in the DIFCC, even if their dispute has no other connections to the DIFCC.114 This final section of the article will 
conduct a brief survey of the DIFCC’s jurisdictional rules and case law, in order to determine if the DIFCC’s experiences 
hold any lessons for the development of the SICC’s rules. 
  
There are two main avenues through which the DIFCC can have jurisdiction over a dispute. The first avenue is where the 
dispute is connected to the DIFC *146 through one of the gateways set out in art.5(A)(1)(a)-(e) of the Dubai Judicial 
Authority Law.115 The second avenue is where the parties agree to submit their disputes to the DIFCC, whether before or after 
the dispute arises.116 This avenue grants the DIFCC jurisdiction even over cases which have no other connection to the DIFC. 
There are no unique statutory principles governing the exercise of the DIFCC’s jurisdiction, unlike in the SICC. Instead, the 
DIFCC applies English common law principles for this purpose. As such, in the DIFCC, the common law Spiliada test 
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applies to govern the court’s exercise of jurisdiction,117 and where there is a jurisdiction agreement, the DIFCC applies the 
“strong cause” test.118 One exception to this rule is that the natural forum calculus does not apply where the contest is between 
the DIFCC and a different court in the UAE.119 This is because the Union Supreme Court of the UAE is vested with the 
authority to decide jurisdictional disputes between courts in the UAE, and the DIFCC has held that it should not appropriate 
that jurisdiction for itself.120 
  
What lessons do the DIFCC’s experience hold for the SICC’s jurisdictional principles? As a preliminary observation, it is 
worth noting that most of the issues highlighted in this article to be ironed out with the SICC’s exercise of jurisdiction stem 
from its interaction with existing common law rules and the Hague Convention. Since the DIFCC is independent of the Dubai 
legal system, and the UAE has not yet ratified the Hague Convention, the DIFCC does not face the same challenges of 
harmonising different sets of rules. 
  
It may be argued that since the common law jurisdictional approaches have worked well for the DIFCC, the SICC should not 
be averse to applying the same approaches for its own jurisdiction. However, this overlooks the fact that one major difference 
between the SICC and the DIFCC is that the SICC possesses a statutory framework providing for both the existence and 
exercise of jurisdiction, while the DIFCC only has a statutory framework providing for the former. As has been argued in this 
article, the content of the SICC’s statutory rules for the exercise of its jurisdiction militate against the application of the 
common law jurisdictional approaches to the SICC. In addition, another cogent difference between the SICC and the DIFCC 
is their contextual background. The DIFCC’s original objective was to serve as the DIFC’s main dispute resolution forum by 
hearing all civil and commercial matters arising from the DIFC.121 As such, the DIFCC was more akin to a conventional 
domestic court exercising general civil jurisdiction than the SICC, and there was accordingly no policy requirement for the 
DIFCC to possess uniquely narrow grounds for it to decline jurisdiction. Even with the expansion of its jurisdiction in 2011, 
the common law jurisdictional approaches continue to suit the DIFCC’s purposes well enough. In contrast, the SICC exists 
alongside the Singapore High Court within the same jurisdiction and exercises jurisdiction in parallel with it. As a result, 
strict boundaries regarding the SICC’s nexus of *147 jurisdiction are required in order to clearly delineate its zone of 
operation from that of the High Court’s. Since the scope of cases over which the SICC can exercise jurisdiction is already 
limited, it stands to reason that the grounds under which the SICC should refuse to exercise jurisdiction be construed 
narrowly in order not to further restrict the SICC’s reach. 
  
VII. Conclusion 
The introduction of both the SICC and the Hague Convention in quick succession in Singapore is a bold and game-changing 
step that sets Singapore firmly on the trajectory to become an international commercial dispute resolution hub in the region 
and beyond. The ambition and vision in advocating these remarkable initiatives is commendable, and the Singapore 
Government can surely be counted upon to have the will and resources to see these initiatives through to their eventual 
fruition. Aside from being a major milestone in the internationalisation of Singapore’s legal industry, the advent of the SICC 
and the Hague Convention also represents the dawn of a new era in Singapore’s private international law; three distinct sets 
of conflict of laws rules presently co-exist within the boundaries of a single national jurisdiction. It is hoped that this article 
will be a useful contribution to the clarification and harmonisation of Singapore’s private international law in this new age, 
and that the issues pointed out in this article will be instructive for any other jurisdictions contemplating similar legal 
developments or facing similar legal challenges. 
  
Kenny Chng 
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